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140 abstract
According to business climate and competitiveness indicators published by inter-
national organisations, Croatia is a country with a rigid labour market and a high 
level of the legal protection of employees. Given that an Act on Amendments to the 
Labour Act (OG 73/13) entered into force in Croatia in June 2013, this paper 
examines changes in employment protection legislation in Croatia and Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) countries, as well as in Croatia's main trading part-
ners during the period between 2008 and 2013. A cross-country comparison 
shows a strong downward trend in legal employment protection in most CEE 
countries during the observed period, primarily as concerns individual dismissal 
in the cases of regular employment contracts, while in the case of temporary em-
ployment the protection strengthened slightly. On the other hand, despite the 
adoption of amendments to the Labour Act (LA), Croatian labour legislation go-
verning employment protection for regular employment contracts remains relati-
vely inflexible compared to that in other countries.
Keywords: Employment Protection Legislation Index, labour market rigidity,   
Labour Act, regular and temporary contracts, collective dismissals, Central and 
Eastern Europe, Croatia
1 introduction
Changes in the labour legislation aimed at labour market flexibilisation have been 
among the most popular structural reforms in Europe after the outbreak of the fi­
nancial and economic crisis. Croatia is no exception in this regard. The Act on the 
Criteria for Participation in Tripartite Bodies and Representativeness for Colle-
ctive Bargaining, passed in mid-2012, repealed the possibility of an open-ended 
application of legal rules from expired or terminated collective agreements. In the 
same year, an Employment Promotion Act was passed, expanding the previous 
active labour market policy measures with a view to reducing both cyclical and 
structural unemployment through employment promotion programmes for long-
term unemployed persons and a ‟vocational training without employment rela­
tionship” programme. A new Act on Amendments to the Labour Act (OG 73/13) 
was introduced in June 2013, whose main purpose was not only to harmonise the 
Croatian labour market regulations with those of the EU but also to increase la­
bour market flexibility. Moreover, the second phase of the LA reform has been 
announced, expected to result in further flexibilisation of labour legislation. De­
spite initial announcements that the second part of amendments to the LA would 
be adopted by end 2013, this has not come true yet, neither was it clear, at the time 
of writing this paper, when further changes to the Act could be expected.
Many international institutions reiterate the importance of implementing structu­
ral labour market reforms in Croatia. The International Monetary Fund, for exam­
ple, within its regular consultations, emphasizes the necessity for labour market m
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141 reforms1, and the European Commission, in its Recommendations (2013:19), sug­
gests that it is the labour market reforms that should be given greater importance 
within the 2013 Economic Programme for Croatia. It is a common perception 
among professionals but also the wider public that Croatia’s labour market is in­
flexible and burdened by heavy hiring and dismissal costs. 
Taking this into consideration, the author assesses different employment protec­
tion legislation indexes for Croatia before and after the adoption of Amendments 
to the Labour Act in June 2013, and analyses the flexibility of Croatian labour le­
gislation as compared to that in other countries. The paper assesses the OECD2 
Index of Employment Protection for regular open-ended contracts, including col­
lective dismissals (EPRC) and Index of Employment Protection for temporary 
contracts (EPT), based on an analysis of the Labour Act. Moreover, the Ease of 
Employment Index has been estimated, based on a data base published by the 
World Bank.3
It has been estimated that the EPRC index for Croatia declined slightly, from 2.9 
in 2008 to 2.7 in 2013, as a result of reforms in the area of collective dismissals. 
If only regular contracts are taken into account, this area of labour legislation has 
remained unchanged from 2008, which is in contrast with the reforms carried out 
in most other countries (Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy and 
Slovenia), which decreased employment protection for regular contracts in the 
reference period. By contrast, due to a revision of Article 10 of the LA which go­
verns fixed term contracts, the Employment Protection Index for temporary con­
tracts dropped from 2.2 in 2008 to 2.0 in 2013, so that in 2013, Croatia’s EPT was 
in line with the peer countries’ average. 
The assessment of the employment protection legislation indexes for Croatia was 
followed by their detailed analysis aimed at establishing which legal provisions 
resulted in labour market inflexibility even after the adoption of amendments to 
the LA. It was found that Croatia was more rigid than other countries in respect of 
employment protection for regular contracts, due to complicated hiring and di­
smissal procedures, according to which employment contract cannot be termina­
ted before the person is retrained and reassigned to another position, and in the 
case of termination of an employment contract, the employer is obliged to take 
into account the person’s age and length of service. In the case of reemployment, 
priority rules for redundancies apply, i.e. where an employee is dismissed on bu­
siness grounds, the employer is not allowed to hire another employee for the same 
job for six months. Furthermore, the employer is required to notify not only the 
employee but also the workers’ council of his/her intention to terminate an em­
1  For more information, see the IMF website at: http://www.imf.org/external/country/HRV/index.htm; IMF 
Staff visit reports on Article IV Consultations, Croatia.
2 For more details, see: OECD (2013) and (2013a).
3 For more details, see: World Bank (2014).m
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142 ployment contract. These procedures are more rigid in Croatia than in other CEE 
countries.
In addition to the OECD EPRC and the EPT indexes, this article briefly analyses 
the World Bank’s Ease of Employment Index which allows a comparison with a 
larger number of countries. It has been estimated that Croatia ranked 161th on the 
ease of employment among 189 countries at the beginning of 2013, and 146th after 
the adoption of Amendments to the LA in June 2013 (this estimations are based on 
the assumption that the labour legislation in all peer countries remained unchan­
ged during 2013). The findings of the Ease of Employment Index analysis also 
show that the Croatian labour market is extremely rigid compared to peer countri­
es, especially as concerns hiring and firing regulations.
This article complements the existing literature (Biondić et al., 2002; Matković 
and Biondić, 2003; Tonin, 2009; and CNB, 2013) on the (in)flexibility of labour 
legislation and labour market in Croatia. Biondić, Crnić and Martinis (2002), as­
sess the flexibility of labour legislation on the basis of the Labour Act of 2001 (OG 
82/01), Matković and Biondić (2003) on the basis of the LA of 2003 (OG 114/03), 
and Tonin (2009) on the basis of the LA of 2004 (OG 137/04), while CNB, makes 
the assessment on the basis of the LA of 2009 (OG 149/2009). To the knowledge 
of the author, this is the first research work dealing with labour market flexibility 
which takes into account changes resulting from the Act on Amendments to the 
Labour Act in 2013 (OG 73/13). Furthermore, the article provides a detailed de­
scription of the OECD EPRC and EPT indexes, as well as the World Bank’s Ease 
of Employment Index, used as indicators of the strictness of labour legislation, 
which is also a novelty in the relevant domestic literature. Therefore, this article 
features the latest and most comprehensive assessment of the available internatio­
nal labour market rigidity indexes.
2 employment protection legislation
The legal framework regulating the hiring, dismissal and other procedures related 
to the labour market is supposed to ensure timely adjustment of the labour market 
to fluctuations in the economic activity, while maintaining an adequate level of 
protection of employees (OECD, 2013).4 Given the variety of current legal sy­
stems and individual laws governing the labour market, the OECD used to assess 
and publish an Employment Protection Legislation Index (EPL) which allowed a 
cross-country comparison of the labour legislation. The EPL index comprised a 
wide range of indicators that could be grouped into three main employment pro­
tection categories: regular contracts, temporary contracts and collective dismis­
sals. The overall index was calculated as the weighted average of these indicators. 
The relative significance of individual indicators was determined using a detailed 
methodology.5 The overall EPL index could have values from 0 to 6, where a low 
4  For more details, see OECD (2013).
5 For more details, see Venn (2009:39-45) and CNB (2013).m
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143 index value indicated flexible labour legislation, and vice versa. The index was 
assessed at a four-year interval for the previous four-year period, and was publi­
shed in the above-described form from 1985 to 2008. While the OECD published 
no EPL index for Croatia, its values were estimated at three occasions, suggesting 
extremely strict labour legislation. The EPL index for Croatia was first estimated 
in 2002, when it stood at 3.58 (Biondić, Crnić and Martinis, 2002), and then in 
2003, after the passing of the Act on Amendments to the Labour Act (OG 114/03), 
when it dropped to 2.76 (Matković and Biondić, 2003), mainly due to the intro­
duction of legislation on temporary work agencies, the activities of which have 
not been previously regulated by law. Tonin (2009) estimated the EPL index for 
Croatia using the LA of 2004, i.e. its articles relevant for the determination of the 
EPL index which were the same as those used in the paper by Matković and 
Biondić (2003). However, due to a slightly different interpretation of some arti­
cles, the obtained EPL value was slightly lower, 2.7. During 2008, the OECD 
modified its EPL index assessment methodology, by including three additional 
indicators. As a result, the index assessed on the basis of the LA (OG 149/2009) 
and the new methodology stood at 2.61 (CNB, 2013). 
In July 2013, after a four-year break, the OECD published its updated information 
on employment protection legislation for the previous four-year period, based on 
a new approach regarding the assessment of individual indicators relevant for the 
evaluation of employment protection legislation. According to the new approach, 
the labour market legislations were primarily examined by OECD experts, while 
in the previous cases, data had been obtained by the competent national institu­
tions. This change resulted in the uniform interpretation of the relevant laws and 
application  of  the  OECD  methodology  itself,  which  allowed  a  better  cross-   
co  untry comparison of the labour market legislation. Due to changes in data col­
lection and the evaluation of indicators, the already published data for 20086 have 
been revised. Hence, it is worthy of note that the estimates for Croatia deviate 
from those based on the OECD methodology, since they were not made by OECD 
experts. Instead of this, the values of individual indicators for Croatia are author’s 
estimates based on the relevant provisions of the Croatian LA and her interpreta­
tion of the OECD methodology.
Besides this methodological change, another novelty, crucial for the interpretation 
of employment protection legislation was introduced in 2013. While the availabi­
lity of underlying indicators for the assessment of the EPL index remained un­
changed from 2008, the EPL value was no more available and was not published. 
Instead, two summary indexes were considered alternatively: the index of em­
ployment protection for regular contracts, including collective dismissals (EPRC) 
and index of employment protection for temporary contracts (EPT). The new me­
6 For further details about methodological changes in the assessment of the Employment Protection Legisla­
tion Index, see OECD (2013:76-77).m
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144 thodology for calculating the two key summary employment protection indexes is 
presented in tables 1 and 2.
table 1
Construction of the summary Index of Employment Protection for regular   
contracts, including collective dismissals 
Index of 
employment 
Protection 
for regular 
contracts, 
including 
collective 
dismissals 
(ePRc)
Index of 
employment 
Protection 
for regular 
contracts 
(ePR) (5/7)
Procedural 
inconveniences 
(1/3)
Notification procedures (1/2)
Delay involved before notice can start (1/2)
Notice and 
severance pay 
for no-fault 
individual 
dismissals (1/3)
Notice period after 9 months tenure (1/7)
Notice period 4 after years tenure (1/7)
Notice period after 20 years tenure (1/7)
Severance pay after 9 months tenure (4/21)
Severance pay after 4 years tenure (4/21)
Severance pay after 20 years tenure (4/21)
Difficulty  
of dismissal 
(1/3)
Definition of justified or unfair dismissal (1/5)
Length of trial period (1/5)
Compensation following unfair dismissal (1/5)
Possibility of reinstatement following unfair 
dismissal (1/5)
Maximum time to make a claim of unfair 
dismissal (1/5)
Index of 
employment 
Protection 
against 
collective 
dismissals 
(ePc) (2/7)
Collective 
dismissals
Definition of collective dismissal (1/4)
Additional notification requirements (1/4)
Additional delays involved before notice can 
start (1/4)
Other special costs to employers (1/4)
Source: OECD (2013a).
table 2
Construction of the summary Index of Employment Protection for temporary   
contracts
Index of 
employment 
Protection for 
temporary 
contracts 
(ePt)
Fixed term 
contracts 
(1/2)
Valid cases for use of fixed-term contracts (FTC) (1/2)
Maximum number of successive FTC (1/4)
Maximum cumulated duration of successive FTC (1/4)
Temporary 
work agency 
employment 
(1/2)
Types of work for which temporary work agency (TWA) 
employment is legal (1/3)
Restrictions on number of renewals (1/6)
Maximum cumulated duration of TWA assignments (1/6)
Does the set-up of a TWA require authorisation or reporting 
obligations (1/6)
Do regulations ensure equal treatment of regular and agency 
workers at the user firm (1/6)
Source: OECD (2013a).m
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145 According to OECD (2013), the main reason for non publishing of the overall 
EPL index is the fact that all implemented reforms do not have equal effects on the 
labour market, neither can these effects be unambiguously quantified and measu­
red. Therefore, introducing two alternative indexes should provide a better insight 
into the labour market flexibility. Thus, for example, the results of the flexibilisa­
tion of employment protection for temporary contracts will depend on the concur­
rent employment protection for regular contracts. Aoyagi and Ganelli (2013) de­
monstrate on a panel of OECD countries that a high level of employment protec­
tion for regular contracts combined with a low level of protection for temporary 
contracts results in labour market dualism. Literature offers many studies on ad­
verse aspects of dual labour markets. Khan (2010), for example, shows that dere­
gulation of temporary contracts increases the share of such contracts in total em­
ployment, yet without any major influence on the total number of employed per­
sons. Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) came to the same conclusion, showing that the 
flexibilisation of the labour market ‟at the margin” (only for temporary forms of 
employment, such as fixed term contracts) initially results in higher overall em­
ployment, but this ‟honey moon effect” wears off eventually and regular emplo­
yees are replaced by those employed on temporary contracts. Furthermore, nume­
rous studies (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Blanchard, 2002) suggest that labour 
market dualism results in lower productivity, which, in the long run, reduces eco­
nomic growth rates. Dualism also has a strong effect on wage dynamics in the 
labour market. Boeri (2011) demonstrates that there is a wage premium for regular 
employment contracts, as opposed to temporary contracts. The premium ranges 
from 6.5% in England to a high of 45% in Sweden.7 
The substitution between temporary and regular employment can be avoided if the 
relative flexibility of both types of contracts is equal. Otherwise, dual markets will 
develop, with outstanding protection of persons employed on regular contracts 
and poor protection of those employed on temporary contracts, who will bear the 
full burden of a possible adjustment in the number of employees in times of crisis.
With all this said, in an environment of inflexible labour legislation, the flexibili­
sation of only the part of the legislation which governs temporary employment 
will have no major effect on the labour market, but it can lead to a decrease in the 
EPL value, which, in turn, can distort conclusions about the desirability of certain 
reforms for labour legislators. Therefore, the OECD has recommended that the 
EPL index, as an indicator of employment protection legislation be abandoned, 
and that the EPRC and EPT indexes be used, as they provide a parallel insight into 
the movements of employment protection legislation for both regular and tempo­
rary contracts.
7 In contrast to the above mentioned papers, the author of this article assesses some labour market flexibility 
indicators, but the article does not explore the interconnection between the values of selected flexibility/rigidity 
indicators and labour market outcomes (employment dynamics, employment rate, unemployment rate, etc.).m
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146 Another motive for introducing the two alternative summary indexes which pro­
vide a better insight into the labour market flexibility is the fact that, during the 
recent crisis, many countries carried out labour legislation reforms in order to re­
move rigidities, improve their international scores and, consequently, become 
more attractive to investors. Therefore, such indexes make it easier to detect the 
areas of labour legislation which have been reformed. 
Each of the indicators included in the assessment of summary EPRC and EPT 
indexes, as well as the summary indexes themselves, can take on a value between 
0 and 6, where low-value indicators or indexes are assigned to countries with fle­
xible labour legislation, and high values of indicators/summary indexes suggest 
inflexible legislation8.
Using the relevant versions of the LA, the summary EPRC and EPT indexes for 
Croatia have been estimated, and the country’s position has been analysed in rela­
tion to comparable countries and the main trading partners in 2008 and 2013, i.e. 
immediately before and after the outbreak of the crisis. CEE countries – new EU 
Member States with similar transition processes, in terms of institutional and eco­
nomic characteristics, were choosen as comparable countries for Croatia. Also 
included were Croatia’s main trading partners, given that labour cost is one of the 
key determinants of cost competitiveness, and high level of employment protec­
tion results in high employer costs of hiring/dismissal. This implicitly increases 
labour cost and distorts a country’s cost competitiveness relative to its trading 
partners.9
The 2008 data for Croatia were taken from the LA (OG 149/09) and the sources 
of data for 2013 were all the relevant amendments to the LA, adopted by July 
2013. This made it possible to quantify the effects of reforms carried out pursuant 
to Amendments to the Labour Act, adopted in June 2013 (OG 73/13). Although 
this paper is based on the 2009 LA (OG 149/09), which became applicable as late 
as January 2010, as all the relevant items used for calculating the summary em­
ployment protection indexes are the same in both the LA of 2009 (OG 149/09) and 
LA of 2004 (OG 137/04), the results are considered valid for 2008 as well. More-
over, given that most other observed countries implemented labour legislation 
reforms in the specified period, with a view to increasing labour market flexibility, 
the analysis was focused on the relative change in Croatia’s position compared to 
the selected countries.
8  The OECD compiles and publishes 21 indicators and two aggregate indexes for the OECD members, as well 
as Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Latvia, Russia, South Africa and Saudi Arabia.
9 The main trading partners have been determined on the basis of direct import and export competitiveness 
and export competitiveness in third markets. The OECD publishes data for Slovenia, Poland, Estonia, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Latvia (post-communist EU Member States), as well as Italy, Austria and 
Germany (Croatia’s main trading partners).m
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147 3 changes in employment protection for regular contracts,  
  including collective dismissals
As shown in chart 1, in the period immediately before the crisis, Croatian em­
ployment protection legislation for regular contracts, including collective dismis­
sals was stricter than that in other countries, with the EPRC index standing at 2.9 
(the observed countries’ average was 2.6 and the average for OECD countries 
2.4). Accordingly, Croatia was among the most rigid countries in the observed 
group, along with Italy and Germany, while new EU Member States were much 
more flexible.
chart 1
Summary Index of Employment Protection for regular contracts, including   
collective dismissals for Croatia and selected countries, 2008 and 2013
Estonia
Hungary
Slovakia
OECD
Slovenia
Poland
Austria
SIE+3*
Czech R.
Croatia
Italy
Latvia
Germany
0     1     2      3       4
EPRC 2008 EPRC 2013
*SIE+3 stands for a simple value average for Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia (CEE countries) and Austria, Italy and Germany (Croatia’s main 
trading partners). 
The value of 4 indicates extremely strict labour legislation and the value of 0 extremely flexi-
ble legislation. 
Sources: OECD (2013c) and author’s estimate for Croatia.
Amendments to the Labour Act (OG 73/13) led to a change in the collective re­
dundancy procedure, which had a direct effect on the EPRC index because of a 
change in the indicator measuring additional delays in the start of the notice pe­
riod in the case of collective dismissals. According to the OECD methodology, 
where an additional delay in the notice period in the case of collective dismissals 
(respective to regular dismissals) is not possible, the relevant indicator takes on 
the value of 0. For possible delays of 25, 30, 50, 70 and 90 days, the relevant in­
dicators take on the values of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively. If the possible delay is 
longer than or equal to 90 days, the indicator takes on the value of 6. Since the 
public employment service was authorised to order an additional 3-month delay in 
the notice period in the case of collective dismissals, this indicator for Croatia 
took on the value of 6. Pursuant to Amendments to the LA (OG 73/13), the addi­m
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148 tional delay in the notice period, to be determined by the public employment ser­
vice in exceptional cases, for all employees who are offered a redundancy pro­
gramme, has been reduced from 90 to 30 days. However, besides this additional 
delay of notice period decided by public employment service, pursuant to Article 
112, paragraph (3) of the Act, an employer may not dismiss employees who have 
been offered a redundancy programme before the expiry of thirty days from the 
delivery of the programme to the competent public employment service. Thus, it 
can be concluded that the total additional delay period in the case of collective 
dismissals is 60 days. If the total delay period in the case of collective dismissals 
is compared with regular delays in the start of the notice period for regular em­
ployment contracts (10 days10), the additional delay in the case of collective di­
smissals in 2013 was 50 days. With this delay period, the indicator reflecting ad­
ditional delays in the start of the notice period for collective dismissals had the 
value of 3. Owing to this change, the summary EPRC index dropped from 2.9 to 
2.7. Other implemented amendments to the LA had no effect on the EPRC index.
table 3
Subindex of employment protection for regular contracts (EPR) and subindex for 
employment protection against collective dismissals (EPC) for Croatia and   
comparable countries, 2008 and 2013
  ePR 2008 ePR 2013 ePc 2008 ePc 2013
Austria 2.12 2.12 3.25 3.25
Czech R. 3.00 2.87 2.13 2.13
Estonia 2.56 1.74 1.75 2.88
Croatia 2.55 2.55 3.75 3.00
Italy 2.60 2.41 4.13 3.75
Latvia – 2.57 – 3.75
Hungary 1.82 1.45 3.38 3.63
Germany 2.72 2.72 3.63 3.63
Poland 2.20 2.20 2.88 2.88
Slovakia 2.19 1.81 3.75 3.38
Slovenia 2.43 1.99 3.38 3.38
OECD 2.15 2.04 2.90 2.91
SIE+3* 2.42 2.22 3.20 3.22
* For the explanation of SIE+3, see footnote below chart 1. 
Sources: OECD (2013c) and author’s estimate for Croatia.
10  According to the OECD methodology, the delay in the start of the notice period for regular employment 
contracts is 6 days, if it is necessary to, give a written warning prior to the employee prior to the dismissal, in 
the case of dismissal on grounds of employee conduct. An additional delay of 3 days is granted if the no  tice 
of dismissal must be in writing. According to the LA, prior to a regular dismissal on grounds of employee 
conduct, the employer is obliged to warn the employee in writing of a possibility of dismissal. The notice of 
dismissal must be in a written form and it must include a written statement of reasons. The workers’ council 
must be notified of the intention to dismiss an employee.m
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149 Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy and Slovenia also increased the 
flexibility of their employment protection regulations for regular contracts, inclu­
ding collective dismissals in the said period, so that the average EPRC index for 
these countries stood at 2.5 in 2013 (2.3 for OECD countries). The relative posi­
tion of Croatia with respect to the EPRC value remained the same as in 2008. The 
reforming economies have addressed all areas of law governing regular contracts, 
facilitating  the  dismissal  procedures,  reducing  notice  periods  and  severance 
payments, but also redefining the terminology related to unfair dismissals.
Since the EPRC index comprises the overall legal framework governing rights 
and obligations arising from regular contracts and those related to collective di­
smissals, the subindex of employment protection for regular contracts (EPR) and 
the subindex of employment protection against collective dismissals (EPC) can be 
analysed separately. This analysis shows a marked deterioration in the relative 
position of Croatia according to the EPR index in 2013 relative to 2008. 
By separating the EPRC index into two subindexes (EPR and EPC), we find that 
through a recent reform, Croatia reduced the subindex of employment protection 
against collective dismissals from 3.75 in 2008 to 3.0 in 2013. The selected 
countries’ average was 3.2 and was not significantly changed (see table 3). In 
contrast to the reforms of employment protection for regular contracts in Slova­
kia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy and Slovenia which have made this 
area of labour legislation more flexible, the reforms of legislation governing col­
lective dismissals in Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Hungary have not 
brought any changes in collective dismissals. Moreover, collective dismissals in 
Estonia and Hungary have become relatively more inflexible as compared to regu­
lar terminations of employment contracts. Besides in Croatia, collective dismis­
sals became more flexible only in Italy and Slovakia. It is evident that collective 
dismissal regulations remained relative inflexible in all the countries, suggesting 
that there is a consensus that collective dismissals should be regulated more 
strictly, since mass redundancies can have extremely negative effects on commu­
nity welfare (OECD, 2013:86).
The subindex of employment protection for regular contracts for Croatia stood at 
2.55 in 2008 and remained at that level in 2013, given that the 2013 reform brou­
ght no changes regarding regular contracts. The labour legislation reforms in most 
of the selected countries were mainly targeted at this area, and consisted primarily 
in facilitating hiring and dismissal procedures (Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary), 
as well as in significant shortening of notice periods and reductions in severance 
pays (Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia and Czech Republic). As a result, the subindex 
of employment protection for regular contracts for selected countries dropped 
from 2.4 in 2008 to 2.2 in early 2013, while the early-2013 average for OECD 
countries stood at 2.0.m
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150 table 4
Details of the calculation of EPC index for Croatia, based on the analysed 
amendments to the LA
  2008 2013
  Weights of 
individual 
indicators 
in total 
EPC index   
(in %)
Value 
pursuant 
to the 
la (oG 
149/09)
contri-
bution to 
total 
ePc 
index
share in 
total 
ePc 
index  
(in %)
Value 
accor-
ding to 
the la 
(oG 
73/13) 
contri-
bution to 
total 
ePc 
index 
share in 
total 
ePc 
index  
(in %)
Index of 
Employment 
Protection against 
collective dismissals 
(EPC)
100   3.75 100   3.00 100
Definition of 
collective dismissal 25 3 0.75 20 3 0.75 25
Additional 
notification 
requirements
25 3 0.75 20 3 0.75 25
Additional delays 
involved before 
notice can start
25 6 1.50 40 3 0.75 25
Other special costs 
to employers 25 3 0.75 20 3 0.75 25
Source: Author’s estimates.
Slovenia, for example, reformed its Labour Act (Zakon o delovnih razmerjih), 
with a view to increase flexibility. Employee dismissal procedures were streamli­
ned, notice periods were shortened and severance pays in the case of unfair di­
smissal were cut. Estonia also reduced notice periods and severance pays and fa­
cilitated hiring and dismissal procedures. Moreover, Estoina made considerable 
changes in the ‟possibility of reinstatement following unfair dismissal” proce-
dure. Consequently, the reinstatement of an employee in the case of unfair dismis­
sal is now subject to mutual consent of both the employer and employee (before 
the reform, the employee’s reinstatement was subject to a court ruling).
Despite the reform, Croatia’s employment protection legislation on regular con­
tracts still deviates sharply from the observed countries’ average. Therefore, we 
will analyse in detail which indicators of the EPR index contribute to its high va­
lue.m
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151 table 5
Details of the calculation of EPR index for Croatia, based on the analysed 
amendments to the LA
  2008 2013
  Weights of 
individual 
indicators 
in total 
EPR index  
(in %)
Value 
pursuant 
to the 
la (oG 
149/09)
contri-
bution to 
total 
ePR 
index 
share in 
total 
ePR 
index  
(in %)
Value 
accor-
ding to 
the la  
(oG 
73/13)
contri-
bution to 
total 
ePR 
index 
share in 
total 
ePR 
index  
(in %)
Index of 
Employment 
Protection for 
regular contracts 
(EPR) 
100   2.55 100   2.55 100
Notification 
procedures 17 4 0.67 26 4 0.67 26
Delay involved 
before notice can 
start
17 1 0.17 7 1 0.17 7
Notice period after 9 
months tenure  5 2 0.10 4 2 0.10 4
Notice period after 4 
years tenure 5 3 0.14 6 3 0.14 6
Notice period after 
20 years tenure 5 2 0.10 4 2 0.10 4
Severance pay after 
9 months tenure 6 0 0.00 0 0 0.00 0
Severance pay after 
4 years tenure 6 3 0.19 7 3 0.19 7
Severance pay after 
20 years tenure 6 2 0.13 5 2 0.13 5
Definition of 
justified or unfair 
dismissal
7 4 0.27 10 4 0.27 10
Length of  
trial period 7 3 0.20 8 3 0.20 8
Compensation 
following unfair 
dismissal
7 3 0.20 8 3 0.20 8
Possibility of 
reinstatement 
following unfair 
dismissal
7 4 0.27 10 4 0.27 10
Maximum time to 
make a claim of 
unfair dismissal
7 2 0.13 5 2 0.13 5
Source: Author’s estimates.
A detailed analysis of the situation in Croatia shows that the indicator measuring 
the notification procedures in the case of regular dismissal, accounts for 26% of 
the total value of EPR subindex in 2013. According to the OECD methodology, m
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152 the notification procedures where it is sufficient that the employer orally commu­
nicates his/her decision on dismissal to the employee are scored as the most flexi­
ble (the score of 0). Where the employer is required to hand to an employee a di­
smissal with the statement of reasons in a written form, the indicator takes on the 
value of 2, and where it is required that the dismissal should be notified by the 
employer not only to the employee but also to a third party (e.g. the workers’ 
council), the indicator takes on the value of 4. The notification procedures where 
the employer must obtain permission from a third person to make the dismissal 
valid are rated as the most inflexible (rating 6). According to the LA (OG 73/13), 
the notice of dismissal must be delivered to the employee in writing (Article 112), 
and the intention to cancel an employment contract must be notified to the wor­
kers’ council (if any). The employer is required to consult with the council about 
the decision (Article 118). As a result of the above mentioned legal procedures, 
this indicator for Croatia took on the value of 4 in 2013.
Moreover, the indicator measuring flexibility in the definition of justified or unfair 
dismissal accounted for 10% of the total value of EPR subindex in 2013. If an 
employee’s competence (dismissal on personal grounds) or the cessation of the 
need for certain jobs (dismissal on business grounds) are sufficient reasons for the 
termination of a regular employment contract, the index takes on the value of 0. It 
takes on the value of 2 if the termination of an employment contract requires from 
an employer to take into account the employee’s age and length of service. The 
indicator is scored as 4 if an employment contract cannot be terminated before the 
employee is retrained and reassigned to another job, and the indicator stands at 6 
if the law does not provide for dismissal on grounds of an employee’s (in)compe­
tence. According to Article 107 of the LA (OG 73/13), dismissals on personal and 
business grounds are permitted only where the employer cannot reassign the em­
ployee to another job (retrain him/her for another job). When deciding on such 
dismissals, the employer must take into account the length of service, age, disabi­
lity and maintenance obligations of the employee. As a result of this, the indicator 
took on the value of 4 in 2013.
While dismissals on personal and business grounds are allowed in Croatia only in 
the above mentioned cases, in Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia, a dismissal is considered as unfair only if it results from the discrimina­
tory treatment of employees (discrimination based on religion, ethnicity, trade 
union membership, etc.).
The indicator measuring the incidence of court rulings ordering the reinstatement 
of dismissed employees accounts for another 10% of the total EPR subindex va­
lue. This indicator takes on value 4, as in Biondić et al. (2002), Matković and 
Biondić (2003) and Tonin (2009). (The score of 0 is given to the labour legislation 
under which courts are not inclined to cancel a dismissal and reinstate an emplo­
yee to his/her former job, and the score of 6 to the legislation where such court m
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153 rulings are exceptionally frequent.)11 The more frequent the reinstatement of di­
smissed employees and cancelling of dismissals by courts, the higher the value of 
this indicator. Nevertheless, the amendments to the LA have no direct influence on 
this indicator, at least unless the judicial authority to reinstate employees to their 
former positions is abolished. In Estonia, for example, the reinstatement of an 
employee is subject to a mutual agreement between the employee and employer, 
but this is the only country among analized countries providing for such an option. 
In all other countries, the competent court may adjudicate that an employee should 
be reinstated in the case of unfair dismissal. The above mentioned three indicators 
together account for one third of the EPR subindex value, which leads to the con­
clusion that complex dismissal procedures and a broad interpretation of unfair 
dismissals are the sources of inflexibility of regular employment legislation in 
Croatia compared to other countries.
4 changes in employment protection for temporary  
  contracts 
In 2008, employment protection for temporary contracts in Croatia was around 
the average for comparable countries. The EPT index for Croatia and comparable 
countries was 2.2 (2.1 for OECD countries).
chart 2
Summary Index of Employment Protection for temporary contracts for Croatia 
and comparable countries, 2008 and 2013
Germany
Latvia
Croatia
Hungary
OECD
Slovenia
Czech R.
Austria
SIE+3*
Poland
Slovakia
Italy
Estonia
0     1     2      3       4
EPT 2008 EPT 2013
* For the explanation of SIE+3, see footnote below chart 1. 
Sources: OECD (2013c) and author’s estimate for Croatia.
11 Biondić, Crnić and Martinis (2002) indicate that the score assigned to Croatia is in line with the transi-
tion countries’ average. A new assessment of this indicator is currently impossible, due to unavailability of 
public data on court judgements in labour disputes. As an approximate indicator, annual reports on the work 
of the State Attorney’s Office of the Republic of Croatia (DORH) in the period from 2006 to 2012 have been 
analysed, showing that labour disputes decided in favour of employees account for 2/3 of total labour dispu­
tes involving the DORH, which is in line with the score assigned to Croatia. This analysis is incomplete, bec-
ause it leaves out judgements in private sector disputes, and because it relates to all labour disputes, regard­
less of their types, but, due to a lack of other data, it is the only one possible.m
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154 The indicator measuring validity of the use of fixed term contracts accounts for 
the bulk of the value of this summary index for Croatia (45%). According to the 
LA (OG 149/09), an employment contract could be concluded for a definite period 
of time only in exceptional cases, when the end of employment relationship has 
been pre-determined for objective reasons, such as the meeting of a specific de­
adline, completion of a task or occurrence of a specific event (Article 10). Accor­
ding to the OECD methodology, fixed term contracts that are valid only if used for 
‟objective reasons” are scored as the most inflexible (the score of 6). Where such 
contracts additionally involve exceptions on the part of either the employer or the 
employee which are allowed for concluding a fixed term contract, then the rele­
vant indicator is assigned the score of 4, and where exceptions are allowed simul­
taneously for both the employer and employee, the score is 2. Where there are no 
legal constraints on the conclusion of fixed term contracts, the indicator takes on 
the value of 0. Given that the Croatian LA provided for conclusion of fixed term 
contracts where this was justified by objective reasons, with an explicit exception 
for employees (first employment, employment of a probationer or trainee), regu­
lated by Article 37, paragraph (3) of the LA, this indicator for Croatia was assig­
ned the score of 4.12 
As a result of amendments to the LA from July 2013 (OG 73/13) relating to fixed 
term contracts, EPT index dropped from 2.2 in 2008 to 2.0 in 2013. This change 
was due to a reform of Article 10 on fixed-term employment. The first use of fixed 
term contracts was no more subject to time limits. However, in order to protect 
employees’ rights, in the case of successive fixed term contracts, the maximum 
duration of contracts remained limited to three years. Moreover, restrictions with 
respect to reasons for the conclusion of the first fixed term contract were lifted, 
whereas the possibility of concluding successive fixed term contracts was only 
allowed if the employer had objective reasons for that which he had to clearly 
state in writing. Austria and Hungary also have no restrictions as to the objectivity 
of reasons for the first use of fixed term contracts (although this restriction does 
exist for each subsequent fixed term contract). Therefore, according to OECD re­
12 It is noteworthy that this indicator for Croatia is scored as 6 in Tonin (2009), but it is assigned the score of 4 
in Matković and Biondić (2003). Moreover, during consultations with legal experts, opposing opinions were 
expressed, so that the value of this indicator, according to some interpretations, might be higher than 4. The 
effective assessment regarding fixed term contracts should be interpreted with caution, because, according to 
the OECD methodology, the weight assigned to this indicator is the highest, i.e. its value is the most signifi­
cant for the assessment of the total EPT index (the weight makes up 25% of the index). Equally ambi  guous is 
the interpretation of the question regarding the maximum duration of employment via temporary work agen­
cies. Specifically, an assessment is made of the allowed maximum cumulative duration of employment thro­
ugh temporary work agencies. According to the LA, there is no limit in this respect, but there is a one-year 
limit on the allowed maximum cumulative duration of successive contracts. However, the term successive is 
not specified in the OECD methodology. In earlier studies by Matković and Biondić (2003) and Tonin (2009), 
this indicator was assigned the score of 4, although Tonin (2009) notes that the required period of break after 
one year of employment through an agency (one month) can be considered as a relatively non-rigid limit 
imposed by legislators. Given that the weight assigned to this indicator is 8%, this question is not crucial for 
the assessment of the EPT index.m
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155 commendations, after the amendments to the LA, this indicator was assigned the 
score of 1.13 
table 6
Details of the calculation of EPT index for Croatia, based on the analysed 
amendments to the LA
  2008 2013
  Weights of 
individual 
indicators 
in total 
EPR index  
(in %)
Value 
pursuant 
to the 
la (oG 
149/09)
contri-
bution to 
total 
ePt 
index 
share in 
total 
ePt 
index  
(in %)
Value 
accor-
ding to 
the la 
(oG 
73/13)
contri-
bution to 
total 
ePt 
index 
share in 
total 
ePt 
index  
(in %)
Index of 
Employment 
Protection for 
temporary contracts 
(EPT)
100   2.21 100   1.96 100
Fixed term contracts 
Valid cases for use 
of fixed-term 
contracts (FTC)
25 4 1.00 45 1 0.25 13
Maximum number 
of successive FTC
13 0 0.00 0 4 0.50 26
Maximum 
cumulated duration 
of successive FTC
13 1 0.13 6 1 0.13 6
Temporary work agencies
Types of work for 
which temporary 
work agency (TWA) 
employment is legal
17 1.5 0.25 11 1.5 0.25 13
Restrictions  
on number of 
renewals
8 2 0.17 8 2 0.17 9
Maximum 
cumulated duration 
of TWA assignments
8 0 0.00 0 0 0.00 0
Does the set-up of a 
TWA require 
authorisation  
or reporting 
obligations?
8 2 0.17 8 2 0.17 9
Do regulations 
ensure equal 
treatment of regular 
and agency workers 
at the user firm?
8 6 0.50 23 6 0.50 26
Source: Author’s estimates.
13 For more details on the regulation of fixed term contracts in Austria and Hungary, see OECD (2013b).m
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156 In 2013, the indicator measuring the maximum number of successive fixed term 
contracts took on the value of 4 (0 before the reform). To be more specific, 
although   the Croatian legislation does not envisage any maximum number of suc­
cessive fixed term contracts, according to the amended Article 10, an extension of 
the first temporary contract is only allowed if there are objective reasons for that. 
In addition, where the first employment contract is concluded for a period of more 
than 3 years, the employer cannot conclude the next consecutive fixed term con­
tract with the same employee (Article 10, paragraphs (2) and (4)). Based on a 
comparison with Austria and Hungary which apply similar solutions in the case of 
successive fixed term contracts, this indicator is assigned the score of 4.
Thanks to the reform of Article 10, this issue was brought into line with the EU 
practice, where the use of fixed term contracts is not conditioned by objective re­
asons, which makes it easier for employers to hire employees. However, in order 
to protect the rights of employees, such contracts are restricted by the maximum 
duration or maximum number of successive contracts.
In contrast to Croatia and Slovenia which reported falls in their EPT indexes, the 
value of the index increased in Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and 
Germany, so that the average for selected countries stood at 2.2 in 2013. The 
growth in this index was primarily due to the harmonisation of the temporary 
work agencies’ regulations with the applicable EU directives. However, through 
the flexibilisation of the first use of fixed term contracts, Croatian legislation be­
came more convergent with that of Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia which impose no ‟objective reasons” constraints on the use 
of fixed term contracts.
Another indicator having a significant influence on the value of the summary EPT 
index for Croatia in 2013 was the one relating to the regulation of temporary work 
agencies. This  indicator  measures  equality  of  pay  and  other  work  conditions 
between persons employed through temporary work agencies and other workers 
performing the same jobs. According to the OECD methodology, where there is 
no legal obligation to give the temporary work agency employees the same tre­
atment as that given to other employees the indicator takes on the value of 0. 
Where the law prescribes equality with respect to pay or other work conditions, 
the indicator is scored as 3. Where it prescribes equality of pay and other work 
conditions, the score is 6. According to the LA (OG 73/13), the contracted salary 
and other work conditions for assigned workers in Croatia may not be lower or 
less favourable, than the pay and other work conditions for workers employed 
with the user at the same jobs (Article 26). However, as shown by a cross-country 
comparison, similar regulations were in force in most of the CEE countries, as 
well as in most OECD member countries. Hence, this indicator had the maximum 
value for as many as 23 countries in 2013. This is not surprising, given that all the m
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157 EU Member States should define their respective temporary work agency legisla­
tion by applying the EU Temporary Agency Work Directive.14
A detailed analysis of employment protection legislation for regular and tempo-
rary contracts (on the basis of EPR and EPT indexes) shows that inequality of 
protection between the two types of employment became even more pronounced 
after the adoption of amendments to the Croatian LA. The 2013 EPR index remai­
ned unchanged from 2008 (2.55), while the EPT index declined, from 2.2 in 2008 
to 2.0 in 2013.
chart 3
Ratio between EPR and EPT indexes for Croatia and selected countries, 2008 and 
2013 
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* For the explanation of SIE+3, see footnote below chart 1. 
Sources: OECD (2013c) and author’s estimate for Croatia.
In all other reforming countries, the difference in employment protection between 
the two types of contract has been reduced (chart 3), mainly through flexibilisation 
of regular (permanent) contracts. Consequently, increasing the flexibility of regu­
lar employment and reducing inequalities in employment protection between dif­
ferent types of employment remain as challenges for the second phase of the LA 
reform, announced for 2014.
At this point, it should be noted that a comparison between the EPRC and OECD 
EPT indexes makes it possible to analyse formal rigidity of the labour market, but 
not the effective one, which may depend on many factors, some of which are not 
determined by law. Thus, for example, regardless of the labour legislation, labour 
market rigidity largely depends on how this legislation is implemented by the 
competent institutions, since the rigidity of implementation may vary considera­
14 European Commission Directive (104/2008/EC).m
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158 bly from country to country. Moreover, many aspects of the labour market regula­
tion remain outside the scope of the analysed indexes, e.g. the regulation of wor­
king hours which influences the flexibility of working time organisation, or the 
manner of conclusion and implementation of collective agreements, representing 
the main determinant of labour market rigidity in the peripheral countries of the 
eurozone. In this respect, the LA reform in 2013 led to reduction of minimum 
uninterrupted daily rest period from ten to eight hours, in order to better organise 
the work in agriculture, tourism and catering which, require split shift working 
time due to their specific nature. This change increased the flexibility of operation 
of enterprises, but is not reflected in the OECD indexes. Also, as a result of the Act 
on Amendments  to  the Act  on  Mediation  in  Employment  and  Rights  during 
Unemployment (OG 153/13) passed in December 2013 the rights during unem­
ployment of persons employed in crafts, trades and free lancers, and private far­
mers became equal to those of employees with legal entities, which is again not 
shown in the OECD indexes. Hence, it is important to note that, due to their for­
mat, the OECD indexes provide only a general picture of labour market flexibility 
which also has some drawbacks. In addition, even those labour legislation aspects 
that are included in the index are not fully comparable. In Croatia, for example, 
the determinants of flexibility in the definition of unfair dismissal (priority rules 
for redundancies and the obligation to retrain or reassign an employee to another 
job) apply only if the employer has more than 20 employees. The structure of the 
OECD index is inappropriate to distinguish between the uses of these rules depen­
ding on the size of an enterprise. However, the effects on the labour market will 
not be the same if enterprises with 5, 10, 20, 50 or 200 employees are excluded. 
Therefore, absolute and uncritical interpretations of the EPRC and EPT indexes 
should be avoided.
5 ease of employment index
Another labour market flexibility indicator which is much wider in scope than the 
EPL index, and, given the availability of the data, can be estimated for most 
countries in the world, is the World Bank’s Ease of Employment Index. Unlike the 
OECD indexes, this one measures strictness of a country’s legislation related to 
working hours, but it does not analyse collective dismissals or the operation of 
temporary work agencies. Furthermore, the World Bank methodology assumes 
that an ‟average worker” representing a country earns an average wage, that his/
her religion and race are the average religion and race in the analysed country, that 
he/she works in the largest city in the country, in a manufacturing company with 
60 employees which is exclusively in domestic ownership, and that he/she is not 
a member of any trade union.15 In view of all this, as well as the fact that manufac­
turing in Croatia accounted for 15.6% of gross value added in 2013, it is evident 
that these assumptions undermine the representativeness of employees in the eco­
nomy. Hence, despite being based on a considerably larger sample of countries, 
15  For more details, see World Bank (2012).m
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159 which makes it more valuable than the OECD indexes, this index gives only a 
partial picture of labour market flexibility.
The Ease of Employment Index has been originally intended for measuring em­
ployer costs arising from labour legislation, whereas the utility of an employee 
arising  from  the  employment  protection  legislation  was  neglected.  Due  to 
widespread   criticism of this approach, the World Bank set up a working group to 
include a minimum level of workers’ rights in the calculation of the index, in line 
with ILO standards. After the inclusion of a minimum level of workers’ rights, if 
a country’s labour legislation is too flexible to the detriment of workers, the coun-
try will be assigned unfavorable score. For example, a country’s score will be lo­
wer if its labour legislation provides for an annual leave of less than 15 days, 
while countries the legislation of which does not provide for at least 1 day of 
weekly rest will be scored unfavourably for such over-flexibility. If a country’s 
legislation does not provide for a minimum wage, the country cannot be assigned 
the best score on the indicator measuring the ratio of the minimum wage to the 
value added per employee, etc.16 
Despite the efforts to improve the index, the World Bank has not published the 
Employment Protection Legislation Index on its Internet site since 2011, but has 
published the data base pertaining to it, so that the index can be estimated. Howe­
ver, all the results obtained by the estimation of this index must be taken with 
extreme caution.17 Having in mind the above mentioned shortcomings of this in­
dex, but also the extreme popularity of all the Doing Business indexes, below 
follows a brief analysis of the Ease of Employment Index.18 The data are taken 
from the World Bank and there is no detailed analysis of individual legal provi­
sions, but only a commentary on the final results.
The Ease of Employment Index is calculated on the basis of two main indicators: 
the Rigidity of Employment Index and Firing Costs Index, where the Employment 
Rigidity Index is the average of three subindexes: the Difficulty of Hiring Index, 
Rigidity of Hours Index and Difficulty of Redundancy Index. Each of the subin­
dexes contains several components which are scored in accordance with the World 
Bank methodology, regardless of the characteristics of a given labour legislation. 
The components of the World Bank’s Ease of Employment Index are presented in 
table 7.
16  For further information, see the World Bank Group (2013).
17  Moreover, in view of the previously mentioned non-publishing of the EPL index, another criticism of the 
Ease of Employment Index may be that its aggregate form does not allow to distinguish between the labour 
legislation providing only marginal flexibility from that where employment protection is equal for both regu­
lar and temporary forms of employment.  
18  World Bank (2013).m
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160 Table 7
Components of the World Bank’s Ease of Employment Index
Ease of 
Employ ­
ment  
Index 
1. Rigidity of 
Employment 
Index
1.1	Difficulty	
of hiring
a)	Fixed-term	contracts	prohibited	for	permanent	tasks
b)	Maximum	length	of	fixed-term	contracts,	including	
renewals	(months)
c)	Ratio	of	minimum	wage	to	value	added	per	workera
1.2 Rigidity  
of	hours
a)	Are	there	restrictions	on	night	work?
b)	Are	there	restrictions	on	weekly	holiday	work?
c)	Can	the	workweek	consist	of	5.5	days	or	can	it	consist	
of	more	than	6	days?
d)	Can	the	workweek	extend	to	50	or	more	hours	
(including	overtime)?
e)	Is	the	average	paid	annual	leave	for	a	worker	with	1	
year	of	tenure,	a	worker	with	5	years	and	a	worker	with	
10	years	more	than	26	working	days	or	fewer	than	15	
working	days?
1.3	Difficulty	
of	redun-
dancy
a)	Is	redundancy	allowed	as	a	basis	for	terminating	
workers?
b)	Should	an	employer	notify	a	third	party	(such	as	a	
government	agency)	to	terminate	one	redundant	
employee?
c)	Does	an	employer	need	approval	from	a	third	party	to	
terminate	1	redundant	employee?
d)	Should	an	employer	notify	a	third	party	to	terminate	9	
redundant	employees?
e)	Does	an	employer	need	approval	from	a	third	party	to	
terminate	9	redundant	employees?
f)	Does	the	law	require	the	employer	to	reassign	or	retrain	
an	employee	before	making	the	employee	redundant?
g)	Do	priority	rules	apply	for	redundancies?b
h)	Do	priority	rules	apply	for	reemployment?
2.	Firing	costs
The	cost	of	the	notice	period,	severance	pay	and	penalties	due	when	
terminating	a	redundant	employee,	expressed	in	weeks	of	salary
a The average value added per employee is the ratio of an economy’s gross national income (GNI) 
per capita to the working-age population as a percentage of the total population. The idea is to 
highlight the labour costs borne by employers.
b For example, employees with the longest tenure will be the last dismissed.
Sources: World Bank (2014). The assessment methodology for individual indicators can be found 
in World Bank (2012).
The	World	Bank	data	suggest	that	Croatia’s	labour	market	is	rigid	in	comparison	
with	the	markets	of	other	countries	included	in	the	analysis.	It	has	been	estimated	
that	Croatia	is	rated	the	worst	compared	to	peer	countries	and	main	trading	part-
ners	(chart	4)	holding	the	161st	position	among	189	observed	countries.
Compared	with	peer	countries,	Croatia	ranks	the	worst	according	to	the	Difficulty	
of	Redundancy	Index	(dismissing	one	or	more	workers).	This	is	due	to	the	fact	
that	Croatia	has	the	largest	number	of	restrictions	on	redundancy	dismissals.	Thus,	m
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161 for example, a third party (workers’ council) must be notified of the intended di­
smissal of a redundant employee, the employer is required to reassign to or retrain 
a worker for another job before making the worker redundant, and priority rules 
for redundancies apply (depending on the worker’s length of service, age, disabi­
lity and maintenance obligations), and for reemployment (in the case of a dismis­
sal on business grounds, the employer is obliged to offer the dismissed employee 
a new employment contract where a need for reemployment at the same job oc­
curs in the next six months from the dismissal).
chart 4
Components of the Ease of Employment Index (ranking), early 2013
1
18
115
155
164
173
189
38
38
82 
82 
82
98 
98
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
Difficulty of Redundancy Index (ranking) Firing Costs Index (ranking)
Difficulty of Hiring Index (ranking) Rigidity of Hours Index (ranking)
72
146
14
29
32
49
64
79
87
99
127
132
147
121
121
157
172
90 
94 
94 
94 
94 
42
42
59
59
59
59
96 
96 
96
121 
121 
121
145
A country’s ranking is obtained by calculating the averages of indicators relevant to a particu-
lar index (see table 7) which are then used to assess the position of each country in the group of 
countries as a percentage of the total value for the group. Then a list of countries by rankings 
(from 0 to 189) is compiled. The ranking of 0 represents extremely flexible and the ranking of 189 
extremely rigid labour legislation. The World Bank data for Croatia are shown in annex, table 
A2. The assessment methodology for individual indicators is presented in World Bank (2012).
Source: World Bank (2014).
Croatia holds the second-last position among the observed countries in terms of 
the Difficulty of Hiring Index. Specifically, at the beginning of 2013, only in Cro­
atia, Slovenia, Romania, Estonia and Latvia fixed-term employees were prohibi­
ted from performing permanent tasks. The maximum cumulative duration of fi­
xed-term contracts was shorter than in Romania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Au­m
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162 stria, Italy, Poland, Lithuania and Estonia, and the ratio of the minimum wage to 
the average value added per employee was higher than in all the observed coun-
tries except Slovenia and Italy. Although not significantly higher, this ratio ranks 
Croatia among lower-rated countries.
Redundancy costs (average notice period and severance pays for workers with 
1.5, 5 and 10 years of tenure) are lower in Croatia (15 average week salaries) than 
in Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Germany and Lithuania, but considerably 
higher than the averages for Austria and Romania (2 and 4 week salaries respecti­
vely).
The  relative  rigidity  of  Croatian  labour  legislation  in  comparison  with  peer 
countries is also reflected in the Rigidity of Hours Index: according to the World 
Bank, there are restrictions on night and weekly holiday work (in the case of con­
tinuous work) in Croatia. Among the observed countries, only Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania and Romania rank worse than Croatia on this indicator.
chart 5
Ease of Employment Index (ranking), early 2013
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See explanation below chart 4.
Source: World Bank (2014).
Given that the World Bank’s database has been created in early 2013, it does not 
take account of the previously mentioned amendments to the LA. In the following, 
we therefore examine how these amendments were reflected in the Ease of Em­
ployment Index. In view of the design of implemented reforms and the construc­
tion of the World Bank indexes, only the flexibilisation of the use of fixed-term 
contracts, as the consequence of the LA amendments, affected the World Bank’s 
Ease of Employment Index. Other changes in the LA related to areas not relevant 
to this index (such as the regulation of collective agreements). m
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163 Comparing the data for Croatia with Austria and Hungary, regarding the question: 
Are fixed-term employees prohibited from performing permanent tasks? showed 
that recorded answer in World Bank data set is ‟no”, even though such persons are 
allowed to perform permanent tasks but only under the first contract, as is the case 
in Croatia after the adoption of Amendments to the LA. We therefore analyse the 
extent of change in the Ease of Employment Index as a result of this legislative 
change. However, we only make a direct assessment without including some indi­
rect effects. Thus, for example, an improvement in the index, resulting from a 
potentially more flexible application of fixed-term contracts may be partly offset, 
if their share in total employment increases due to the flexibility of this type of 
contracts, which may lead to a decline in productivity in the economy and, conse­
quently, to a rise in the Difficulty of Hiring and Ease of Employment Indexes. 
Taking into account only the direct effects, we estimate that, after the amendments 
to the LA, Croatia moved to the 146th position in terms of the Ease of Employment 
Index. It should be borne in mind, of course, that the new ranking for Croatia 
  assumed that no labour legislation reforms took place in other countries in 2013.     
If  some  other  countries  also  flexibilised  their  labour  legislation,  the  relative 
  improvement in Croatia’s ranking would be smaller. Other changes in the LA, 
implemented in the first phase of the reform had no effect on the Ease of Em­
ployment Index, because this index, unlike the OECD indexes, does not cover 
collective dismissals.
chart 6
Ease of Employment Index after Amendments to the Labour Act (OG 73/13) 
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The ranking of 0 represents extremely flexible and the ranking of 189 extremely rigid labour legi-
slation.
Sources: World Bank (2014) and author’s estimate for Croatia related to the indicator measuring 
‟Whether fixed-term employees are prohibited from performing permanent tasks”.
However, even after the adoption of Amendments to the Labour Act, ranking ac­
cording to the Ease of Employment Index for Croatia remained relatively high 
(146). The continuously poor performance of the index is even more obvious if m
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164 compared with countries in the region. In early 2013, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina ranked 31th, 61th, 71st and 81st on the list re­
spectively.19 Before the LA reform, only Serbia had a lower ranking in terms of the 
Difficulty of Hiring Index (172) than Croatia (157). After the reform, Croatia’s 
ranking was upgraded to 90 (assuming the absence of reforms in the rest of the 
countries during the same period), and the country currently ranks more favou-
rably than both Bosnia and Herzegovina (151th) and Montenegro (125th); while 
Macedonia ranks 1st. As concerns other subindexes, Croatia lags noticeably behind 
countries in the region. Thus, it ranks 115th on the Rigidity of Hours Index, while 
Macedonia ranks the worst (98th) among other countries in the region. According 
to the Difficulty of Redundancy Index, Croatia again ranks the worst among 
countries in the region (145th), followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina (96th). Croa­
tia’s ranking on the Cost of Redundancies Index is also the most unfavourable 
(99), slightly more unfavourable than that of Macedonia (81). Interestingly, Ma­
cedonia belongs to the world’s most flexible countries in terms of difficulty of 
hiring and redundancy. In 2010, this country reformed these procedures and in 
addition it increased the possibility of using fixed-term contracts. However, it is 
difficult to assess the labour market effects of these radical reforms in an economy 
with a pre-crisis unemployment rate amounting to 35%. Nevertheless, the unem­
ployment rate did not go up further and stood at 31% at end-2012. For details of 
the Ease of Employment Index for all the EU member States and countries in the 
region, see table A3. 
6 conclusions
After the implementation of amendments to the LA, Croatia’s employment pro­
tection legislation converged with that in peer countries and trading partners. As 
there was no significant further relaxation of employment protection for fixed-
term contracts in the analized countries, the flexibilisation of Croatia’s LA through 
expanding the valid use of fixed-term contracts has put the country closer to the 
already existing practices in the analized countries. On the other hand, the flexibi­
lisation of employment protection legislation for regular contracts, including col­
lective dismissals took place in almost all the observed countries. In Croatia, ho­
wever, except for the flexibilisation of employment protection legislation for col­
lective dismissals, nothing was done to adjust the employment protection legisla­
tion for regular contracts. Therefore, some of the hiring and dismissal procedures 
remain more complex in this country than in the observed countries. Moreover, as 
the reform failed to increase the flexibility of employment protection for regular 
contracts, it deepened the inequality of protection between different types of em­
ployment in Croatia.
19 In contrast to the OECD which analyses labour market rigidity only for the selected countries, the World 
Bank compiles the Ease of Employment Indexes for 189 countries, which allows a comparison with coun­
tries in the region.m
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165 Additional changes, to be introduced during 2014, are likely to bring further libe­
ralisation of the Croatian labour market and, consequently, more flexible em­
ployment protection legislation for regular contracts. As this article only deals 
with formal measures of labour market flexibility, it is worthy of note that the final 
labour market outcomes may be markedly different, especially in countries with 
high levels of grey economy and in times of economic crisis. Therefore, the ef­
fects of inflexible labour legislation on labour market outcomes remain a cha-
llenge for future research.m
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166 appendix
table a1
EPRC and EPT indexes as sources for assessing employment protection   
legislation pursuant to the Labour Act
Index of Employment Protection for regular contracts, including collective dismissals (EPRC)
Index of Employment Protection for regular contracts (EPR) 
Notification procedures Articles 112 and 118
Delay involved before notice can start Articles 111, 112 and 118 
Notice period after 9 months tenure Article 114, paragraph (1)
Notice period after 4 years tenure Article 114, paragraph (5)
Notice period after 20 years tenure Article 114, paragraph (6)
Severance pay after 9 months tenure Article 119
Severance pay after 4 years tenure Article 119
Severance pay after 20 years tenure Article 119
Definition of justified or unfair dismissal Article 107, paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (7)
Length of trial period Article 35
Compensation following unfair dismissal Article 117, paragraph (1)
Possibility of reinstatement following 
unfair dismissal
Article 116, estimates from Biondić et al. (2002), Matković 
and Biondić (2003) and Tonin (2009)
Maximum time to make a claim of unfair 
dismissal Article 129, paragraphs (1) and (2)
Index of Employment Protection against collective dismissals (EPC)
Definition of collective dismissal  Article 120, paragraph (1)
Additional notification requirements Article 120, paragraph (2); Article 122, paragraph (1)
Additional delays involved before notice 
can start
Article 122, paragraphs (3) and (5) of the LA (OG 149/09); 
Article 122, paragraphs (3) and (5) of the LA (OG 73/13); 
delays in the start of the notice period for regular 
termination of employment contracts according to Article 
111, Article 112 and Article 118, and according to the 
OECD methodology are assessed at 10 days
Other special costs to employers Article 121
Index of Employment Protection for temporary contracts (EPT)
Fixed term contracts
Valid cases for use of fixed-term contracts 
(FTC)
Article10 of the LA (OG 149/09); Article 10 of the LA (OG 
73/13)
Maximum number of successive FTC None for LA (OG, 149/09); Article 10, paragraphs (2) and 
(4) of the LA (OG 73/13)
Maximum cumulated duration of 
successive FTC
Article10, paragraph (3) of the LA (OG 149/09); Article10, 
paragraph (3) of the LA (OG 73/13)
Temporary Work Agency 
Types of work for which temporary work 
agency (TWA) employment is legal Article 24; Article 25, paragraph (4)
Restrictions on number of renewals None
Maximum cumulated duration of TWA 
assignments Article 28, paragraphs (1) and (2)
Does the set-up of a TWA require 
authorisation or reporting obligations Article 24, paragraphs (2) and (3); and Article 32
Do regulations ensure equal treatment of 
regular and agency workers at the user 
firm?
Article 26, paragraph (5)
Source: Labour Acts (OG 149/09 and OG 73/13). The articles of the LA with no references to the 
specific LA are those which remained unchanged after the Amendments to the LA in June 2013. m
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167 Table a2
World Bank data for Croatia
1.1	Difficulty	 
of hiring
a)	Fixed-term	contracts	prohibited	for	permanent	tasks
YES	–	WB	data,	
NO	–	simulated	
change	in	the	LA	
(OG	73/13)
b)	Maximum	length	of	a	single	fixed-term	contract	(months) 36	months
c)	The	ratio	of	the	minimum	wage	of	a	trainee	or	first-time	
employee	to	the	average	value	added	per	employee
0.31
1.2 Rigidity  
of	hours
a)	Are	there	restrictions	on	night	work? YES
b)	Are	there	restrictions	on	weekly	holiday	work? YES
c)	Can	the	workweek	consist	of	5.5	days	or	can	it	consist	of	
more	than	6	days?
6	days
d)	Can	the	work	week	extend	to	50	or	more	hours	(including	
overtime)?
YES
e)	Is	the	average	paid	annual	leave	for	a	worker	with	1	year	of	
tenure,	a	worker	with	5	years	and	a	worker	with	10	years	
more	than	26	working	days	or	fewer	than	15	working	days?
20	days
1.3	Difficulty	 
of	redun-
dancy
a)	Is	redundancy	allowed	as	a	basis	for	terminating	workers? YES
b)	Should	an	employer	notify	a	third	party	(such	as	a	
government	agency)	to	terminate	one	redundant	employee?
YES
c)	Does	an	employer	need	approval	from	a	third	party	to	
terminate	1	redundant	employee?
NO
d)	Should	an	employer	notify	a	third	party	to	terminate	9	
redundant	employees?
YES
e)	Does	an	employer	need	approval	from	a	third	party	to	
terminate	9	redundant	employees?
NO
f)	Does	the	law	require	the	employer	to	reassign	or	retrain	 
an	employee	before	making	the	employee	redundant?
YES
g)	Do	priority	rules	apply	for	redundancies? YES
h)	Do	priority	rules	apply	for	reemployment? YES
The	cost	of	the	notice	period,	severance	pay	and	penalties	due	when	terminating	 
a	redundant	employee,	expressed	in	weeks	of	salary
7.9	weeks	
(notice	period)
7.2	weeks	
(severance	pay)
Source: World Bank (2014).m
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168 table a3
Components of the Ease of Employment Index (rankings) for EU and countries in 
the region
  Difficulty of 
Hiring 
(ranking)
Rigidity of 
Hours 
(ranking)
Difficulty of 
Redundancy 
(ranking)
Redundancy 
costs 
(ranking)
ease of 
employment 
Index 
(ranking)
Austria 1 82 121 11 35
Belgium 42 38 1 30 10
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
151 16 96 46 81
Bulgaria 72 38 1 32 20
Croatia 90 115 145 99 146
Cyprus 94 1 121 24 48
Czech R. 1 1 1 127 18
Denmark 1 18 1 1 1
Estonia 94 164 59 79 119
Finland 125 115 145 54 141
France 160 177 121 72 167
Germany 94 82 121 132 137
Greece 94 175 96 106 151
Hungary 42 189 1 87 88
Ireland 42 1 50 74 27
Italy 90 98 121 29 93
Kosovo 1 75 96 69 50
Latvia 146 38 59 49 73
Lithuania 1 173 59 147 110
Luxembourg 172 164 96 133 178
Macedonia 1 98 1 81 31
Malta 90 82 59 31 58
Montenegro 125 16 59 67 61
Netherlands 72 115 174 37 121
Poland 42 82 96 121 96
Portugal 157 111 121 143 168
Romania 94 155 96 14 103
Serbia 172 26 59 33 71
Slovakia 94 18 96 121 90
Slovenia 172 98 59 64 117
Spain 172 82 59 118 139
Sweden 95 82 121 93 115
UK 42 38 1 36 12
The ranking of 0 represents extremely flexible and the ranking of 189 extremely rigid labour 
legislation. 
Sources: World Bank (2014) and author’s estimate for Croatia related to the indicator measuring 
‟Whether fixed-term employees are prohibited from performing permanent tasks”. m
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